What this is

David Chalmers distinguished the “easy” problems of consciousness — explaining cognitive functions such as discrimination, integration of information, attention and verbal report — from the “hard” problem: why any of that processing is accompanied by subjective experience at all (Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1995; The Conscious Mind, 1996). PhilPapers files this under Explaining Consciousness?, next to What is it like?, The Explanatory Gap, and Cognitive Closure.

Current conversations

• Is there a hard problem at all? Some argue it will dissolve once the easy problems are solved. — PhilPapers: Hard and Easy Problems
• The meta-problem: why do we think there is a hard problem? (Chalmers, 2018) — see consc.net
• The explanatory gap — SEP: Consciousness §3 (Van Gulick)

Suggested learning path

1. SEP: Consciousness for background
2. SEP: Zombies · SEP: Qualia: The Knowledge Argument
3. Chalmers's papers at consc.net
4. Physicalist replies: SEP: Physicalism
5. Lectures: to research

My thoughts

Notes here.

Discussion

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Media

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Sources

• PhilPapers: Hard and Easy Problems · SEP: Consciousness · consc.net